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Abstract. In this paper, we extend the existing models of supply chain resilience assessment by 
incorporating the ripple effect and structure reconfiguration. The research is based on a hybrid 
fuzzy-probabilistic approach. We apply the genome method with the objective to include the 
structural properties of the supply chain design into resilience assessment. We develop a supply 
chain design resilience index, demonstrate its computation and application. The results suggest a 
method to compare different supply chain designs regarding the resilience with both disruption 
propagation and recovery consideration. It also allows identifying groups of critical suppliers 
whose failure interrupt the supply chain operation. 
 
Keywords: supply chain engineering, risk management, resilience, structure dynamics, ripple 
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Introduction 
The supply chain engineering under uncertainties is a major issue in production systems and lo-
gistics (Dolgui and Proth, 2010). One of most challenging problems deals with an increase of 
supply chain resilience, especially facing ripple effect.  
The ripple effect, also known as domino effect or snowball effect (Wierczek 2014) describes the 
disruption propagation in the supply chain (SC), the impact of a disruption on SC performance 
and the disruption-based scope of changes in the SC design (SCD) structures (Liberatore et al. 
2012, Ivanov et al. 2014a,b, Sokolov et al. 2016). Managing the ripple effect is closely related to 
designing resilient SCs.  
SC resilience became one of the key investigation categories over the last decade (Gunasekaran 
et al. (2015). SC resilience is understood in literature as an ability to maintain, execute and re-
cover (adapt) the planned process states along with achievement of the planned (or adapted, but 
yet still acceptable) performance (Sheffi and Rice 2005, Ivanov and Sokolov 2013, 
Kamalahmadi and Mellat-Parast 2016a,b). Recent studies underline the crucial role of resilience 
assessment taking into account disruption risks (e.g., Ivanov et al. 2013, Munoz and Dunbar 
2015, Das and Lashkari 2015, Ivanov et al. 2016).  
The existing studies have mostly focused on the impact of disruptions on SC resilience using 
deterministic approaches and the reliability theory without considering structure reconfiguration 
(Wagner and Neshat 2010, Soni et al. 2014, Kim et al. 2015). Recently, the necessity of inclu-
sion the reconfiguration into SC resilience analysis was manifested by Simchi-Levi et al. (2014), 
Xu et al. (2014), Snyder et al. (2016). However, to the best of our knowledge there is no pub-
lished graph-theoretical research on SCD resilience analysis with both disruptions and recovery 
considerations. In addition, the existing studies (e.g., Kim et al. 2015) consider monotonous SC 
structures (i.e., the failures of structure elements lead to the reliability decrease and recovery of 
structure elements lead to SC reliability increase). In reality, SC structures can be non-
monotonous, i.e., the factors such as competitor behavior can also influence the SC resilience 
(e.g., a failure of one competitor can lead to reliability increase).  
In this study, the following problem is considered. The object of investigation is a multi-stage SC 
different elements of which can be disrupted. The problem is to identify the impact of disrup-
tions at different SC locations on SC resilience and to identify the critical SC nodes and arcs the 
disruptions of which result in SC resilience loss. 
The goal of this study is to develop a method for quantitative analysis of SCD resilience with 
disruption propagation and recovery considerations for both monotonous and non-monotonous 
structures. We are also interested in developing an SCD resilience index that can be used by SC 
managers to compare different SCDs regarding the resilience. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a state-of-the-art over-
view. In Section 3, the research methodology is presented. Section 4 describes the fuzzy-
probabilistic approach and the underlying concept of graph genome. In Section 5, the modeling 
procedure for the SC structure dynamics with reconfiguration is described. In Section 6, the SCD 
resilience index is described. Section 7 is devoted to the experimental part. In Section 8, manage-
rial insights are presented. The paper concludes by summarizing the most important insights 
from the research and delineating future research avenues. 
 
2. Literature review 
The ability to maintain and recover (adapt) the planned execution along with achievement of the 
planned (or adapted, but yet still acceptable) performance is related by most authors to SC resili-
ence (Bakshi and Kleindorfer 2009, Ivanov and Sokolov 2013, Xu et al. 2014, Ambulkar et al. 
2015).  It can be observed in the existing studies that two groups of problem statements for SC 
resilience analysis are generally considered (see Fig. 1): 
 Resilience consideration without recovery measures and 
 Resilience consideration with recovery measures. 
 
Fig.1. Disruption consideration without and with recovery measures 
We limit the literature analysis to graph-theoretical approaches taking into account the focus of 
this research. Stochastic Petri nets have been applied to analyse disruption propagation through 
the SC and to evaluate the performance impact of the disruptions (Wu et al. 2007). Wang and Ip 
(2009) and Soni et al. (2014) develop resilience metrics with the use of graph theory. Wagner 
and Neshat (2010) propose a method of quantifying risk using the permanent of an adjacency 
matrix based on graph theory. Nair and Vidal (2010) analyse the correlation between disruption 
and structural features of network. Hsu and Li (2011) develop a method to evaluate reliability of 
the SC performance under the demand fluctuations.  
Schoenlein et al. (2013) define robustness as the ability of a multiclass queuing network to re-
main stable, if the expected values of the inter-arrival and service time distributions are subject 
to uncertain shifts. Based on the fluid network analysis they present a measure to quantify the 
robustness called the stability radius. Ivanov and Sokolov (2013) describe SC stability, robust-
ness, and resilience as an integrated control problems within the framework of automatic control 
theory. Zobel and Khansa (2014) quantify resilience of supply chain for multiple disruptive 
events. Xu et al. (2014) develop a quantitative model for analysis of predicted SC resilience 
based on structural evolution against random supply disruptions. The study by Lin et al. (2014) 
concentrates on the reliability assessment for a multi-state SC with multiple suppliers as the 
probability to satisfy the market demand within the budget and production capacity limitations. 
They develop an algorithm in terms of minimal paths to evaluate the network reliability along 
with a numerical example regarding auto glass. Garvey et al. (2015) build upon minimal paths 
analysis and suggest using Bayesian network to analyse risk propagation in the SC. This is an 
interesting research avenue. Bayesian networks have also been applied to domino effect analysis 
in chemical industry infrastructures (Khakzad 2015).  
Another important research stream has been the understanding that different kinds of SCD struc-
tures with similar number of nodes and arcs may significantly differ regarding resilience. Bode 
and Wagner (2015) analyse empirically structural drivers of upstream SC complexity and the 
frequency of SC disruptions. They find out dependencies between SC structural complexity and 
disruption occurrence. Kim et al. (2015) apply graph theory to analyse the impact of SC structur-
al characteristics on resilience. This study reveals correlations between network structure and 
disruption impacts. Brandon-Jones et al. (2015) find out the impacts of supply base complexity 
on disruptions and performance. Sokolov et al. (2016) quantify ripple effect in the SC with the 
help of selected indicators from graph theory and develop a hybrid static-model model for per-
formance impact assessment of disruption propagation in a distribution network. Han and Shin 
(2016) assess the SC structural robustness considering disruption propagation in a connected 
graph. They perform quantitative assessment of the structural robustness on random networks 
compared with the probability of network disruption due to the random risk. Tang et al. (2016) 
develop a time-varied cascading failure model and analyse the ripple effect as failed loads prop-
agation in the SC. They present the SC as interdependent structure of an undirected cyber net-
work and a directed physical network, two layers that constitute an SC. The authors develop a 
robustness measure and analyse the SC collapse situations.  
Some critical observations can be derived from this literature review. Typical assumptions that 
an increase in SC resilience depends on the number of nodes and arcs in the SC (i.e., back-up 
suppliers or alternative transportation routes) frequently lead to the solutions where SC resilience 
can be increased only if SC efficiency decreases. In reality, SC structures are different and the 
SCDs with the same efficiency can perform completely differently in regard to resilience. This 
dependence of the SC resilience on the SCD structure has not been studied in literature exten-
sively so far. Furthermore, the performance analysis with the use of individual supplier failure 
probabilities dominates the research domain. At the same time, another important question con-
cerning the disruption propagation and SCD survivability is still at the early stage of investiga-
tions. In the scope of the research described in this article is the analysis of what SC elements 
will survive (i.e., be in operation) after a disruption and under which conditions (i.e., joint fail-
ures in a group of suppliers or a failure at a critical supplier that interrupts the SC operation ful-
ly) the SC can survive or it will lose its survivability. Finally, the issues of SC reconfiguration 
have got only limited attention in recent literature and they will be included into our study. 
 
3. Research methodology 
The research concept of this study is based on the following four stages: 
 Theoretical analysis of the hybrid fuzzy-probabilistic approach with the application to 
SCD resilience analysis 
 Modelling the SC structure dynamics with reconfiguration 
 Development of an SCD structure resilience index (SRI) 
 Validation of the SCD SRI according to the referenced SCD structures from literature. 
In Section 4, theoretical analysis of the hybrid fuzzy-probabilistic approach with the application 
to SCD resilience analysis will be elaborated. In this part, we define the underline concept of this 
study, the graph genome. It will be shown how to develop a SCD genome and how to compute 
its components on an example. Subsequently, the formulas for computing the structure failure 
probability for both monotonous and non-monotonous structures taking into account both ho-
mogenous and heterogeneous failure probabilities and possible failures will be presented. Theo-
retical genome properties will be analyzed and illustrated on an example. 
Section 5 deals with modelling the SC structure dynamics with reconfiguration. In this section, 
the central issue is the description of scenarios for modeling SCD failure and reconfiguration. In 
addition, in this section two underlying optimization problems for computing the failure proba-
bilities in the cases with and without reconfiguration will be defined.  
Section 6 integrates the materials of Sections 4 and 5 and develops SCD structure resilience in-
dex. First, on the basis of the Section 5, an example of SCD reconfiguration path is presented. 
Second, the computation of the SRI with the help of the genome concept from Section 4 is pre-
sented. 
Section 7 is devoted to the validation of the SCD resilience index according to the referenced 
SCD structures from literature. First, we present the SCD structures from study by Kim et al. 
(2015) in terms of fuzzy-probabilistic approach. Second, we compute the resilience index values 
for three cases: worst-case and no reconfiguration, average case and no reconfiguration and aver-
age case with reconfiguration. The results are compared with each other and analyzed. 
 
4 Hybrid fuzzy-probabilistic approach 
The research methodology is based on a hybrid fuzzy-probabilistic approach to network reliabil-
ity analysis.  
 
For both monotonous and non-monotonous structures, we consider genome that can be repre-
sented as a vector 0 1 2( , , ,..., )n     (Kopytov et al. 2010). The genome is composed of the 
integer coefficients of the structure failure polynomial (Eq. 1) (Aggarwal et al. 1973, Ryabinin 
1976, Colbourn 1978):  
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where ( 1 2 ... nQ Q Q Q    ); 
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n
nT Q Q Q Q        .  
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In the case of a monotonous structure,  m is minimum number of failure edge-cuts, tmC is the 
number of combinations from m for t,  
( , )iV R t is the set of SC elements from {1, 2,..., }n , where n is the total number of SC elements in 
the SCD structure graph G= (V, E), i.e., the number of vertices and edges in the graph that can 
be disrupted plus one element. iR  is minimum failure edge-cut (i.e., the edge-cut that does not 
contain any further failure edge-cuts); in the case of an element failure in the edge-cut, the net-
work becomes divided into two non-linked parts, with the source node in the first part, and the 
target node in the second part, 
,  are the logical operators “and” and “or” respectively, 
qQ is the failure probability of a network element. 
The objective of the genome method application to the SCD resilience analysis is to include the 
structural properties of the SCD into resilience assessment. The next specific feature of the ge-
nome method is the usage of minimum structure failure edge-cuts that allows identifying groups 
of critical suppliers or a critical supplier. This means that disruptions at the minimum structure 
failure edge-cut separate the SC into two non-connected parts and operations are interrupted. If 
the minimum edge-cut comprises only one element, this element is called “bridge” (Deistel 
2012).   
In Fig. 2, the monotonous network structure of an SC is depicted.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Monotonous network structure of an SC 
The simplified SC in Fig. 2 comprises five nodes (nodes #1 and #5 are source and target respec-
tively) and ten arcs. For the situation, where disruption may happen only on the arcs, the genome 
of this SCD includes 11 elements. If disruptions would also be considered for nodes, the genome 
would include 16 elements. For simplification of the explanation we assume that the nodes are 
reliable and the failures are subject to the arcs only. In this case, for the given SCD there are five 
minimum failure edge-cuts as follows (Eq. 2):  
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The failure polynomial for this SCD can be represented as follows (Eq.3):  
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or in a more compact form as Eq. (4): 
2 5 7 8 9 10( ) 2 4 5 2 .T Q Q Q Q Q Q Q                 (4) 
 
In the example in Fig. 2, we have m=5, number of combinations from m for t (t=1,2,3,4,5; i.e., 
the combination number for 1,2,3,4 and 5 edge-cuts from five minimum edge-cuts)  equals 
5,10,10,5,1 respectively,  n=10 edges.  The first five members in 1 2 10( , ,..., )T Q Q Q  (Eq. 3) corre-
spond to t=1 (i.e., the edge-cuts from five minimum edge-cuts). Next nine members in Eq. (3) 
with “-“ are related to t=2 (there should be ten members but one member is cancelled by “+” in 
t=3). Next seven members with “-“ are related to t=3 (there should be ten members but one 
member is cancelled by “-” in t=2 and two members are cancelled by “-” in t=4 ). Finally, the 
last two members with “-“ relate to t=4 (there should be five members but two members are can-
celled by “+” in t=3 and one member is cancelled by “+” in t=5 ). The genome of this SCD is 
(0,0,1,0,0,2,0, 4, 1,5, 2)     .The interpretation of this genome is as follows: 
- The SCD contains 10 transportation edges (vector dimensionality is 11=10+1) 
- The components of the genome change their operators (“+” and “-“) three times. This 
means we have three production sites in the SC (vertices #2, #3 and #4). Node #1 is a 
supplier, and node #5 is a customer 
- The last genome component is “-2”. This means, that the graph has an edge to ensure the 
direct and return deliveries (i.e., the edge Q4 is a “bridge” that makes it possible to  deliv-
er products from node #3 to # 4 and return the trucks from #4) 
- The first non-zero genome component “1” is the third one. This means that the SCD has 
one edge combination that contains two edges the failure of which would result in full SC 
destruction (i.e., the edges 1 10{ , }Q Q ).  
- The second non-zero component is “2” and it is the sixth genome component. This means 
that the SCD has two edge combinations each of which contains five edges the failure of 
which would result in full SC destruction (i.e., 2 3 7 9 10{ , , , , }Q Q Q Q Q  and 
5 6 8 9 10{ , , , , }Q Q Q Q Q ). 
 Insight 1. The usage of minimum structure failure edge-cuts allows identifying groups of critical 
suppliers or a critical supplier whose failure separates the network into two disconnected parts 
and interrupts the SC operation. For SC elements at the minimum structure failure edge-cuts, 
back-up sourcing strategies need to be implemented. 
 
Furthermore, the genome encompasses the following properties of the monotonous and non-
monotonous structures: 
 if 0 0   and 1 2 ... 1n       then the failure polynomial 
2
0 1 2( ) ...
n
nT Q Q Q Q         describes the monotonous structure; 
 if 0 1   and 1 2 ... 0n      , then the structure is monotonous and for the failure poly-
nomial is true (0) 1T   and (1) 0T  ; 
 if 0 0   and 1 2 ... 0n      , then the structure is non-monotonous and for the failure 
polynomial is true (1) 0T  ; 
 if 0 1   and 1 2 ... 1n      , then the structure is non-monotonous and for the failure 
polynomial is true (0) 1T  . 
In addition, the following topological properties of the monotonous structures are contained in 
the genome: 
 the power of the lower polynomial member is equal to the minimal power among minimum 
structure failure edge-cuts (i.e., the number of the first non-zero genome component with
0 0,l iè i l     ); the coefficient of the lower polynomial member is always positive 
and equals the number of the minimal-power minimum failure edge-cuts (i.e.,
0 0,l iè i l     ); 
 the power of the highest polynomial member is equal to the number of the network ele-
ments. 
The genome can be used for computing the structure failure probability for both monotonous and 
non-monotonous structures taking into account both homogenous (Fhom) and heterogeneous (Fhet) 
failure probabilities and possible (Fpossib) failures according to Eq. (5): 
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(5) 
In the case of homogenous failure probabilities, the network failure probability for the polyno-
mial 20 1 2( ) ...
n
nT Q Q Q Q         is in the interval [0,1]. The closer the failure function to 
the line ( ) 1T Q  , the lower is the network reliability. This property allows using Eq. (6) for 
computing the indicator of the network structure failure: 
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For heterogeneous failure probabilities, Eq. (7) is used: 
1 1 1
1 2 1 2 0 1 2 2
0 0 0
1 1 1
( ) ... ( , ,..., ) ... ( , , ,..., ) (1, , ,..., )
2 2 2
T
het n n n n
F T Q Q Q dQ dQ dQ         .  (7) 
However as pointed out in recent literature (Lim et al. 2014, Simchi-Levi et al. 2014), the usage 
of failure probabilities in SCD decisions is quite restrictive. Such estimations can be problematic 
if not enough statistical data is available to fairly estimate the failure probabilities. For this rea-
son, the alternative approach can be the usage of the fuzzy-method based on the fuzzy possibility 
space (Singer 1990). 
The fuzzy possibility space can be described as ( , ( ), )X X P , where X is a set of elementary 
events, ( )X is σ-algebra of subsets in the space X , called the events, and the functions
: ( ) [0,1]P X  , called the possibility measure (i.e., ( )P A  is the possibility of the event
( )A X ). The event possibility is defined by the possibility distribution function : [0,1]g X 
as ( ) sup ( )
x A
P A g x

 . In the possibility measure space, the fuzzy element ( )    ( : [0,1]X  ) 
is defined. Its membership function can be described as the possibility distribution function 
 ( ) ( ) ( ),x P x g x x X     . 
Further assume that the SC network structure comprises ( ), 1,2,...,i i i n     fuzzy elements. 
Using the operators for fuzzy structures ( 1 2 1 2 1 2          , 1 2 1 2      ), the struc-
ture failure possibility polynomial with homogenous fuzzy elements ( 1 2 ... :n       ) can 
be described as 20 1 2( ) ...
n
nT             , where 0 1 2( , , ,..., )n     is the structure 
genome. 
Similar to the probabilistic approach, we consider the computational procedure for the indicator 
of the network structure failure. According to reliability theory, in the function class ( )L X a pos-
sibility measure integral is defined in (Pyt’ev 2002). The function class ( )L X includes the func-
tions :f X L , where ([0, 1], , , )L     is the possibility value scale in the interval [0, 1], sub-
ject to operators  , «+» and «  »: max{ , }a b a b  and min{ , }a b a b  ). These functions en-
compass the following properties: 
1. [0,1], ( ) ( )f L X f L X        . 
2. ( ), :[0,1] [0,1]f L X v    are the involutions of the monotonously decreasing function 
(0) 1, (1) 0v v  ) ( ( )) ( )v f v f x L X   (Pyt’ev 2002). 
3. ( ), 1,2,....if L X i   
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f x f x L X f x f x L X
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Integral : ( )p L X L for the possibility measure ( ) sup ( )
x A
P A g x

  at the distribution g is defined 
as: ( ) supmin{ ( ), ( )}
x X
p f f x g x

 . If the possibility measure is defined by the distribution 
( )g L X , then the following is true (Eq. 8): 
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g x g x f x g x p f
 
 

   
 
  
     

    
             (8), 
where ( )s f is classical Sugeno fuzzy integral (Sugeno 1974). 
The polynomial of the structure failure possibility 20 1 2( ) ...
n
nT             is always 
bounded as 0 ( ) 1T   . For monotonous structures ( )T  , (0) 0, (1) 1T T  also increases mo-
notonously. For non-monotonous structures, the polynomial of the structure failure possibility is 
either (0) 1T   or (1) 0T  ), or ( (0) 1, (1) 0)T T  . Since the polynomial of the structure failure 
possibility is a function :[0,1]T L , it belongs to the class ([0, 1])L . 
This property allows using as an integral indicator of the structure failure possibility the integral 
for the possibility measure (Eq. 9) and provides evidence for structure failure probabilities de-
fined in Eq. (5): 
2
[0,1] [0,1]
( ) sup min{ ( ), ( )} sup min{ (1, , ,..., ) , ( )}n TpossibF T g g
 
       
 
   .  (9) 
 
 
5. Modelling the SC structure dynamics with reconfiguration 
As a consequence of a disruption, a SCD can have the form of different states S. A state repre-
sents the SCD (i.e., the graph G=(V,E)) subject to non-disrupted and disrupted elements. Due to 
the fact that the SC elements can recover after a failure it should be noted that the initial state S0 
denotes the state where no SC element is failing. Subsequently, due to disruptions and recovery 
actions, the SCD graph can transit through different states. An example for five state levels is 
given in Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3. Levels of the SC structure dynamics 
The first degradation level corresponds to those states with the failure in one element; the second 
degradation level corresponds to the states with the failure in two elements, etc. The recovery 
actions move the SCD back from the second level to the first level, and so on. The sequence of 
the transitions through the structural states is called SC structure dynamics control (Ivanov et al. 
2010, Ivanov and Sokolov 2012). The sequence of events for the structure dynamics is called the 
structure dynamics scenario. 
Scenarios belong to crucial issues in the SCD resilience analysis. In general, we do not know 
exactly which elements will fail. However, the structure failure polynomial (Eqs 1 and 2) con-
tains the graph structure. For example, in the case of Q1 failure, we have an indirect failure of 
Q2,Q3,Q4,Q5,Q6,Q7,Q8, and Q9. In other words, the SCD will transit in a state where 
Q1,Q2,Q3,Q4,Q5,Q6,Q7,Q8, and Q9 are missing. 
In addition, failures in different elements may have different impact on the SCD resilience. That 
is why we suggest analyzing homogenous, heterogeneous and possibilistic failures, respectively.  
Finally, recovery actions may influence the resilience. That is why we suggest considering three 
scenarios, i.e., worst case (failure in the most critical elements and no recovery measures), aver-
age case and no reconfiguration, and average case with reconfiguration (see Sect. 6). 
Since genome represents the SCD, each structural state S can be described by a genome  . 
Therefore, the total resilience or total failure of a path in the SC structure dynamics can be com-
puted using Eqs (6), (7) and (9). With the help of integrating these indicators, SCD resilience can 
be quantified for homogenous, heterogeneous and possibilistic failures and recovery actions. 
Consider the SC reconfiguration processes. Denote as j
Q
  the transition from one struc-
tural state S  (described as a genome  ) to another structural state S (described as a genome  ) 
as a consequence of a failure/recovery in a graph element ˆjQ Q . Denote as ( )X  the set of all 
structural states subject to  . Then, a reconfiguration scenario in the degradation or recovery 
process subject to an initial state 0S and the state fS can be described as the following transition 
chain (Eq. 10): 
3 11 2
0 1 2 1
... ,j j jj j N N
N N
Q Q QQ Q
        


       (10) 
where
0 0
,
N f 
     , 
1 2
ˆ{ , ,..., }
Nj j j
Q Q Q Q  
The structural changes in the intermediate states 

on the reconfiguration path will be described 
as structural failure indicator ( ) { ( ), ( ), ( )}failure hom het possibF F F F       . Then the problem of 
optimistic structure reconfiguration path ((i.e., the case where recovery actions are included) can 
be described as the following optimization problem (11): 
0
1
1 2
0
0
( )
, ,
( ) ,
ˆ{ , ,..., } .
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N
j j
N
N
failure
j
f
j j j
minimize F
subject to
X
Q Q Q Q

 
 

   
 


 



 
 
(11) 
To solve the problem (11), a hybrid branch-and-bound/evolutionary algorithm has been devel-
oped as follows. 
Step 1. At each k -iteration, a random sequence is built
0 1 2 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , ..., ,
N N
k k k k
               
(where
0 0
,
N f 
     ) that corresponds to a structure reconfiguration path.  
Step 2. For the structure reconfiguration path, the indicator
1
( ) ( )
1
( ) ( )
j
N
k k
failure failure
j
F F  


  is com-
puted. The random transition to an intermediate state subject to genome ( )
j
k


is modeled accord-
ing to normal distribution.  
Step 3. The value of
1
( ) ( )
1
( ) ( )
j
N
k k
failure failure
j
F F  


 for the structure reconfiguration path is com-
pared with the F-value at k-1 iteration. 
Step 4. The path with highest F-value is used in the following iterations. 
The problem of pessimistic structure dynamics path (i.e., the case where no recovery actions are 
included) can be described as the following optimization problem (12): 
0
1
1 2
0
0
( )
, ,
( ) ,
ˆ{ , ,..., } .
j
N
j j
N
N
failure
j
f
j j j
maximize F
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X
Q Q Q Q

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 
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   
 


 



 
 
(12) 
 
6. Development of the SC design resilience index 
In Fig. 4, a path 
( )k
 of SC structure reconfiguration is shown.  
 
Fig. 4. Supply chain structure reconfiguration path 
 
The area 
kS  equals ( )
0,1,...,
min { ( )}
j
k
failure
j N
F N

 and describes the total structural resilience for a 
given reconfiguration path by holding the structure failure values during the reconfiguration. The 
computed area 1
( ) ( )
1
0
0
( ) ( )
2
j j
k k
N
failure failurek
j
F F
S
   




 
describes the total structural resilience for a 
given reconfiguration path by changes in the structure failure values during the reconfiguration 
on the path 
( )k
 . In this case, the relation (Eq. 13) describes the SCD resilience during the struc-
tural reconfiguration on the path 
( )k
  
0
k
k
k
S
J
S
            (13) 
max max{ }k
k
J J
 
corresponds to the optimistic scenario, and min min{ }k
k
J J corresponds to the 
pessimistic scenario.  
Consider M experiments. At each k -experiment, the sequence
0 1 2 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , ..., ,
N N
k k k k
               (where 0 0 , N f      ) is built according to a SCD 
structure reconfiguration path. For the path, the value of 0
k
k
k
S
J
S
  is computed. Finally, the 
average of all experiments is computed as shown in Eq. (14). 
0
1
1 M k
k
J J
M 
            (14) 
The SCD structure resilience SUJ  belongs to the interval  [
minJ , maxJ ] and the expected SC 
resilience is 
0J . The values of SUJ  can be described as a fuzzy triple ( , ,a   ), where
0a J , 
0 minJ J   , max 0J J   . 
Considering three cases (monotonous structure, non-monotonous structure and structure with 
possible failures), three fuzzy triples are computed ( , ,î î îa   ), ( , ,n n na   ), ( , ,a    ). 
Then the integral SCD structure resilience SUJ

is computed as Eq. (15): 
( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )
( , , )
3
î î î n n n
SU
a a a
J a
       
    
 
     (15) 
Finally, the center-of-gravity method is used to avoid the fuzziness in the final solution (Eq. 16): 
( )
3
SUE J a
      .         (16) 
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7. Experimental results 
For analysis, we consider four SC network structures from the study by Kim et al. (2015) (Fig. 
5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a)       b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c)        d) 
Fig. 5. References SC network structures 
In terms of the probabilistic-fuzzy approach, these structures are represented as shown in Fig. 6. 
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Fig. 6. Modified representation of the referenced SC network structures 
In Fig. 6, the SC nodes are marked grey and SC arcs are marked white. The node #1 is target and 
the node #12 is source.  For example for the structure (a), the failure polynomial can be repre-
sented as follows (note that Q=1-P): 
T(P, Q) = P30 P27 P26 Q25 P24 Q23 Q22 P15 P8 P7 P6 P5 + 
   + P30 P25 P24 Q22 P15 P8 P6 P5 + 
   + P30 P26 P23 Q22 P15 P8 P7 P5 + 
   + P29 P21 P20 Q19 P14 P11 P10 P9 + 
   + P28 P18 Q17 P16 P13 P4 P3 P2 + 
+ P30 P22 P15 P8 P5 + 
   + P29 P19 P14 P11 P9 + 
   + P28 P17 P13 P4 P2 - 
   - P29 P28 P19 P17 P14 P13 P11 P9 P4 P2 - 
   - P30 P29 P22 P19 P15 P14 P11 P9 P8 P5 - 
   - P30 P28 P22 P17 P15 P13 P8 P5 P4 P2 + 
   + P30 P29 P28 P22 P19 P17 P15 P14 P13 P11 P9 P8 P5 P4 P2 - 
   - P30 P28 P22 P18 Q17 P16 P15 P13 P8 P5 P4 P3 P2 - 
   - P29 P28 P19 P18 Q17 P16 P14 P13 P11 P9 P4 P3 P2 + 
   + P30 P29 P28 P22 P19 P18 Q17 P16 P15 P14 P13 P11 P9 P8 P5 P4 P3 P2 - 
   - P29 P28 P21 P20 Q19 P18 Q17 P16 P14 P13 P11 P10 P9 P4 P3 P2 - 
   - P30 P29 P22 P21 P20 Q19 P15 P14 P11 P10 P9 P8 P5 - 
   - P29 P28 P21 P20 Q19 P17 P14 P13 P11 P10 P9 P4 P2 + 
   + P30 P29 P28 P22 P21 P20 Q19 P17 P15 P14 P13 P11 P10 P9 P8 P5 P4 P2 + 
   + P30 P29 P28 P22 P21 P20 Q19 P18 Q17 P16 P15 P14 P13 P11 P10 P9 P8 P5 P4 P3 P2 - 
   - P30 P29 P26 P23 Q22 P21 P20 Q19 P15 P14 P11 P10 P9 P8 P7 P5 - 
   - P30 P28 P26 P23 Q22 P18 Q17 P16 P15 P13 P8 P7 P5 P4 P3 P2 - 
   - P30 P29 P26 P23 Q22 P19 P15 P14 P11 P9 P8 P7 P5 - 
   - P30 P28 P26 P23 Q22 P17 P15 P13 P8 P7 P5 P4 P2 + 
   + P30 P29 P28 P26 P23 Q22 P19 P17 P15 P14 P13 P11 P9 P8 P7 P5 P4 P2 + 
   + P30 P29 P28 P26 P23 Q22 P19 P18 Q17 P16 P15 P14 P13 P11 P9 P8 P7 P5 P4 P3 P2 + 
   + P30 P29 P28 P26 P23 Q22 P21 P20 Q19 P18 Q17 P16 P15 P14 P13 P11 P10 P9 P8 P7 P5 P4 P3 P2 + 
   + P30 P29 P28 P26 P23 Q22 P21 P20 Q19 P17 P15 P14 P13 P11 P10 P9 P8 P7 P5 P4 P2 - 
   - P30 P26 P25 P24 P23 Q22 P15 P8 P7 P6 P5 - 
   - P30 P29 P25 P24 Q22 P21 P20 Q19 P15 P14 P11 P10 P9 P8 P6 P5 - 
   - P30 P28 P25 P24 Q22 P18 Q17 P16 P15 P13 P8 P6 P5 P4 P3 P2 - 
   - P30 P29 P25 P24 Q22 P19 P15 P14 P11 P9 P8 P6 P5 - 
   - P30 P28 P25 P24 Q22 P17 P15 P13 P8 P6 P5 P4 P2 + 
   + P30 P29 P28 P25 P24 Q22 P19 P17 P15 P14 P13 P11 P9 P8 P6 P5 P4 P2 + 
   + P30 P29 P28 P25 P24 Q22 P19 P18 Q17 P16 P15 P14 P13 P11 P9 P8 P6 P5 P4 P3 P2 + 
   + P30 P29 P28 P25 P24 Q22 P21 P20 Q19 P18 Q17 P16 P15 P14 P13 P11 P10 P9 P8 P6 P5 P4 P3 P2 + 
   + P30 P29 P28 P25 P24 Q22 P21 P20 Q19 P17 P15 P14 P13 P11 P10 P9 P8 P6 P5 P4 P2 + 
   + P30 P29 P26 P25 P24 P23 Q22 P21 P20 Q19 P15 P14 P11 P10 P9 P8 P7 P6 P5 + 
   + P30 P28 P26 P25 P24 P23 Q22 P18 Q17 P16 P15 P13 P8 P7 P6 P5 P4 P3 P2 + 
   + P30 P29 P26 P25 P24 P23 Q22 P19 P15 P14 P11 P9 P8 P7 P6 P5 + 
   + P30 P28 P26 P25 P24 P23 Q22 P17 P15 P13 P8 P7 P6 P5 P4 P2 - 
   - P30 P29 P28 P26 P25 P24 P23 Q22 P19 P17 P15 P14 P13 P11 P9 P8 P7 P6 P5 P4 P2 - 
   - P30 P29 P28 P26 P25 P24 P23 Q22 P19 P18 Q17 P16 P15 P14 P13 P11 P9 P8 P7 P6 P5 P4 P3 P2 - 
   - P30 P29 P28 P26 P25 P24 P23 Q22 P21 P20 Q19 P18 Q17 P16 P15 P14 P13 P11 P10 P9P8P7P6P5P4P3P2 - 
   - P30 P29 P28 P26 P25 P24 P23 Q22 P21 P20 Q19 P17 P15 P14 P13 P11 P10 P9 P8 P7 P6 P5 P4 P2 - 
   - P30 P29 P27 P26 Q25 P24 Q23 Q22 P21 P20 Q19 P15 P14 P11 P10 P9 P8 P7 P6 P5 - 
   - P30 P28 P27 P26 Q25 P24 Q23 Q22 P18 Q17 P16 P15 P13 P8 P7 P6 P5 P4 P3 P2 - 
   - P30 P29 P27 P26 Q25 P24 Q23 Q22 P19 P15 P14 P11 P9 P8 P7 P6 P5 - 
   - P30 P28 P27 P26 Q25 P24 Q23 Q22 P17 P15 P13 P8 P7 P6 P5 P4 P2 + 
   + P30 P29 P28 P27 P26 Q25 P24 Q23 Q22 P19 P17 P15 P14 P13 P11 P9 P8 P7 P6 P5 P4 P2 + 
   + P30 P29 P28 P27 P26 Q25 P24 Q23 Q22 P19 P18 Q17 P16 P15 P14 P13 P11 P9 P8 P7 P6 P5 P4 P3 P2 + 
   + P30 P29 P28 P27 P26 Q25 P24 Q23 Q22 P21P20Q19 P18Q17P16P15P14P13P11P10P9P8P7P6P5P4P3P2 + 
   + P30 P29 P28 P27 P26 Q25 P24 Q23 Q22 P21 P20 Q19 P17 P15 P14 P13 P11 P10 P9 P8 P7 P6 P5 P4 P2 
According to the model and algorithm in Sect. 5, the modelling of the worst case (failure in the 
most critical elements and no recovery measures), average case and no reconfiguration, and av-
erage case with reconfiguration subject to both nodes and arcs failures has been performed. Simi-
lar to Kim et al. (2015), we assumed that the node #1 (Target) and node #12 (Source) are not 
perturbed. The computed values of SCD resilience are presented in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Computed values of SCD resilience 
Structure SCD structural resilience SUJ

 
Worst-case (no 
reconfiguration) 
Average case 
(no 
reconfiguration) 
Average case 
(with 
reconfiguration) 
( )SUE J

 
a 0.0615 0.1548 0.7056 0.3073 
b 0.0496 0.2538 0.8606 0.3880 
c 0.0289 0.2527 0.8306 0.3707 
d 0.0456 0.1640 0.7519 0.3205 
 
In Table 2, the results are compared with the resilience estimation from Kim et al. (2015). 
Table 2 Comparison of the values of SCD resilience 
Structure Resilience values 
Kim et al. (2015) Our approach 
(with reconfigu-
ration) 
Our approach (no 
reconfiguration) 
a 0.11 0.31 0.15 
b 0.30 0.39 0.25 
c 0.16 0.37 0.25 
d 0.13 0.32 0.16 
 
In comparing the results of these methods, it can be observed that all methods suggest the same 
order of the resilient SCD: BCDA. At the same time, the difference in the absolute resili-
ence values can be observed in comparing the results of Kim et al. (2015), our results without 
reconfiguration and our results with reconfiguration. Besides, in the study by Kim et al. (2015), 
the SCD #B has a significantly higher resilience as compared to three other structures. In our 
analysis, the resilience of B and C is close to each other. The explanation of these effects can be 
seen in the inclusion of the reconfiguration and fuzzy-probabilistic analysis into resilience index 
computation.  
 
Insight 2. SC resilience depend both on network structure characteristics and recovery policies. 
Fair SC resilience estimation needs to include both proactive and reactive policies in order to 
compare different SCDs regarding the resilience. For SC elements at the minimum structure 
failure edge-cuts, proactive strategies need to be integrated with recovery policies. 
In addition, the inclusion of the minimum edge-cut failures in the genome (instead of individual 
failures in the reliability analysis) is seen as the explanation of the effects in computational re-
sults. This is the benefit and novelty of the proposed approach. It can also be observed that ex-
cept for structure (b), the difference of the values of Kim et al. (2015) and our results in the case 
with reconfiguration is approximately 0.2. The reason for this phenomenon is, on one hand, the 
inclusion of the pessimistic scenario (i.e., worst-case and no recovery actions) into our resilience 
index. Additionally, similarities in failures (to ensure the comparativeness of the results) lead to 
such a correlation. Finally, higher resilience values in our approach can be observed. If compar-
ing the results of our approach with and without reconfiguration, it can be noted that the pro-
posed method to compute structure resilience index works in both cases. Its values also reflect 
clearly that the inclusion of reconfiguration increases the SCD resilience. This insight requires 
more analysis efforts subject to different recovery policies but we can assume the effect of the 
SC structure reconfiguration as resilience increase driver. 
 
8. Managerial Insights 
Disruption risks may result into ripple effect and structure dynamics in the SC. It is to notice that 
the scope of the rippling and its performance impact depend both on robustness reserves (e.g., 
redundancies like inventory or capacity buffers) and speed and scale of recovery actions 
(Knemeyer et al. 2009, Hu et al. 2013, Ivanov and Sokolov 2013, Kim and Tomlin, 2013, Pettit 
et al. 2013). In many practical settings, companies need analysis tools to estimate both the SC 
efficiency and SC resilience. For SC resilience, the impacts of recovery actions subject to differ-
ent disruptions and performance indicators need to be estimated. 
The results of this study contribute to support decisions in these practical problems. The devel-
oped model can help the SC risk managers to identify whether the existing SCD is resilient for 
different disruption scenarios. The model also considers mitigation strategies (i.e., reconfigura-
tion) that can be used by SC risk managers and translated into the SCD changes.  
With the use of the developed approach, SC managers can compare different possible SCDs re-
garding their resilience using the proposed SCD resilience index. Since the calculation of the 
resilience index includes the recovery actions, the developed model can help to identify opportu-
nities to reduce disruption and recovery costs by SC re-design. If the experts can forecast or at 
least assume possible failures and recovery actions, it becomes possible to create reconfiguration 
scenarios (see. Fig. 4) and compute the SCD resilience index subject to optimistic, pessimistic or 
possibility failure scenarios.  
The original feature of this study is that it allows analyzing the groups of critical suppliers or a 
critical supplier whose failure interrupts the SC operation fully. The identification of such critical 
suppliers with the help of genome analysis and minimum edge-cuts usage may allow re-
designing the SC in order to increase the SCD resilience without efficiency decrease. In addition, 
the identification of nodes and arcs in the minimum edge-cuts in the SC the failure of which is 
critical for SCD survivability may help to develop more specific risk mitigation policies such as 
dual sourcing or continuous risk monitoring. 
With the help of the structure dynamics control, the model analyses effective ways to recover 
and re-allocate resources and flows after the disruption. The model can be used by SC risk spe-
cialists to adjust mitigation and recovery policies with regard to critical SCD elements. Finally, 
the usage of the fuzzy-probabilistic approach extends possible application of the developed 
method regarding the data availability for analysis. 
 
9. Conclusions 
In recent literature, SCD models have been extensively considered in the light of severe disrup-
tions. SC resilience became one of the key investigation categories. The existing graph-
theoretical studies have mostly focused on the impact of disruptions on SCD resilience using the 
reliability theory without considering structure reconfiguration. In this paper, we take another 
perspective and extend the existing models to SCD resilience analysis by incorporating the struc-
ture reconfiguration. In the scope of this research is the analysis of what SC elements will sur-
vive (i.e., be in operation) after a disruption and under which conditions (i.e., failure in a group 
of suppliers that interrupt the SC operation fully) the SC can still survive or it will lose its resili-
ence.  
The research methodology is based on a hybrid fuzzy-probabilistic approach to network resil-
ience analysis. The SCD resilience analysis is performed as the analysis of optimistic, pessimis-
tic, and random (possible) reconfiguration paths of an SC structure due to disruptions. The appli-
cation of the developed structure resilience index is demonstrated by the computation on the ref-
erenced SCD examples from the literature. 
The results have some major implications. First, it suggests a method to compare different SCDs 
regarding the resilience. Second, since the reconfiguration is included, the resilience analysis 
becomes more realistic and considers both disruptions and recovery. Third, the developed 
method can be used both for monotonous and non-monotonous structures. Fourth, the usage of 
minimum structure failure edge-cuts allows identifying groups of critical suppliers or a critical 
supplier whose failure separates the network into two disconnected parts and interrupts the SC 
operation fully. 
In future, the gained insights require more detailed analysis efforts regarding the effect of the 
SCD structure reconfiguration as resilience increase driver. It is a very important task to develop 
methods of how to restore the SCD structure from an available genome. This task is quite similar 
to inverse problems in linear programming. In addition, the complexity issue in genome calcula-
tion (e.g., for structure C, the polynomial contains over 3,000 elements) needs to be addressed 
based on the development of efficient heuristic methods. Finally, development of risk mitigation 
policies for critical suppliers at the minimum edge-cuts is an interesting future research avenue. 
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